By Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate | November 19, 2026
Just as the US has been leveraging its large market and technological leadership for geopolitical ends, China is now using its dominance in critical minerals, industrial inputs, and specialized manufacturing machinery to coerce and punish other countries. The consequences, both economic and geopolitical, are far-reaching.
BERLIN—For years, the United States has been using export controls to limit China’s access to advanced technologies. China has repeatedly denounced these measures as “blatant” attempts by the US to strengthen its own “technological hegemony,” arguing that the entire strategy runs “contrary to the principles of market economy.” At the same time, however, China has been steadily building its capacity to retaliate.
China has long used punitive trade measures as a political weapon. But in recent years, it has been laying the groundwork for more comprehensive economic statecraft, largely in response to US pressure. In 2019, for example, China created its Unreliable Entities List as a direct response to Huawei’s placement on America’s Entity List.
The following year, China passed its Export Control Law, which consolidated a fragmented export-control regime in a single framework. In 2021, China issued “blocking rules,” aimed at shielding Chinese entities from extraterritorial application of foreign laws and sanctions. China has also strengthened its ability to wage trade wars, expanded its dual-use export controls, and created a unified licensing system, which requires transaction-specific approvals, detailed technical disclosures, and end-user verification.
Over the last year, however, China has taken this effort to a new level. Two regulations announced by the State Council in April institutionalized a shift from ad hoc measures to a comprehensive legal framework for countering sanctions, foreign interference, and “long-arm jurisdiction.” Decree 834 established a regime for protecting industrial and supply-chain security, and Decree 835 created a statutory basis for responding to “improper extraterritorial jurisdiction of foreign states.”
Now, the Ministry of Commerce has widened the Chinese export-control regime’s scope beyond military and dual-use domains. The new controls, announced last month, cover AI, tunnel-boring and excavation machinery, specialized maritime and dredging equipment, photovoltaic manufacturing technologies, advanced drones and navigation systems, and biotechnology, including cell and gene therapies and genetic-modification processes. Virtually any industrial capability that gives China a competitive advantage is being recast as a national-security asset and subjected to export curbs.
This expansive export-control system is in key respects modeled on that of the US. Just as the US uses its huge market and technological leadership for geopolitical ends, China is leveraging its dominance in critical minerals, industrial inputs, and specialized capital goods. But there is an important difference: China’s unique position in the global economy enables it to exploit other countries’ vulnerabilities in ways that the US cannot.
China’s near-monopoly on rare-earth processing and refining, along with its dominance in other critical minerals, is a case in point: it gives the country powerful leverage over a wide range of vital high-tech industries, including electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, advanced electronics, and defense manufacturing. China’s control over specialized industrial machinery and its broader centrality to global supply chains offer further sources of leverage.
These amount to potent weapons in China’s geoeconomic arsenal. In April 2025, China halted most exports of rare-earth minerals to the US, forcing Donald Trump’s administration to reverse its tariff escalation, negotiate a trade truce, and generally shift from confrontation to accommodation.
But China is not reserving these weapons for the US. China has restricted exports of critical minerals, manufacturing equipment, tunnel-boring machines, industrial components, battery technologies, and lithium-ion-related inputs to India—a clear bid to impede India’s emergence as an alternative global manufacturing hub.
Similarly, China has imposed export restrictions on Japan, often targeting Japanese companies with ties to the defense industry, in order to exert economic pressure and undermine Japan’s effort to strengthen its military. China can use this leverage against other major economies as well, including the European Union, disrupting EV production, renewable-energy projects, defense manufacturing, and major infrastructure investments.
In the long run, China’s export-control regime could prove counterproductive, as it accelerates the global scramble to reduce dependence on its industrial ecosystem. Governments will intensify efforts to diversify mineral supplies, build domestic processing capacity, subsidize strategic industries, and shift manufacturing to more trustworthy countries.
But, by that point, considerable damage may have been done. Already, the normalization of economic coercion by both China and the US is threatening to splinter a trading system built on interdependence, with fragile global supply chains becoming the first casualty. The result could be a global economy that is divided into competing technological and industrial ecosystems.
This would impose a heavy burden on multinational companies, which would have to navigate two regulatory systems. A firm that depends on American technology but operates in China could be caught between conflicting licensing requirements, sanctions obligations, and end-user restrictions. To satisfy both the US and China, manufacturers might need separate supply chains, technology platforms, and compliance systems. The efficiencies that once made globalization attractive would be sharply eroded.
Middle powers and developing economies are in a particularly uncomfortable position. Not only are they vulnerable to economic coercion by the US and China; they risk becoming collateral damage in negotiations between the two superpowers. The US and China might escalate their geoeconomic competition, only to agree to temporary suspensions, exemptions, or truces to stabilize their relationship. These arrangements might abruptly alter smaller economies’ access to critical inputs or expose their companies to conflicting obligations, yet their governments will have little say in the outcome.
A US-China competition once centered on advanced technology is expanding and becoming a struggle over the raw materials, machinery, industrial processes, and supply chains on which virtually every modern economy depends. In that struggle, the rest of the world may have the most to lose.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.
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